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Using Ethics Codes to
Reinforce Lessons of
Statutory Interpretation
Ted Becker,
University of Michigan Law School
To increase my students’ exposure to statutory
interpretation, I assign them early in the second semester
to argue a motion to disqualify counsel based on
imputed disqualification under Michigan’s ethics rules.1
Interpreting ethics rules involves many of the same
“pure” statutory interpretation techniques I introduced
the previous semester, and the students appear to easily
make any needed translations. This exercise also helps
prepare students to interpret other quasi-legislative
authorities like court or evidentiary rules, administrative
codes, and municipal ordinances.2
The assignment hinges on whether a firm timely
screened a new associate to ensure that she did not
reveal confidential client information obtained during
a summer clerkship at a different employer in a matter
in which her new firm represents an adverse party.
Michigan explicitly allows screens of attorneys moving
from firm to firm if certain conditions are met.3
We begin by walking through the language of the rule
phrase by phrase to determine whether the firm is
presumptively disqualified. Students must think about
what it means to “become associated” with a firm and
about the definition of a “substantially related matter.”
The language forces them to follow a cascade of crossreferences to other provisions to devise some tentative
solutions.
Students must then formulate arguments about the
timing question. To help them along, I raise a common
interpretative issue: Did the drafters intend a bright-line
rule that parties can easily follow, or a more open-ended
but less predictable approach? I also emphasize that
even a supposedly clear bright-line test might not be all
that “bright” when applied to a particular set of facts.
Next, we identify whether either side can viably argue
that such a bright-line test exists:
• Michigan does not explicitly provide that a screen
must be imposed within a set time (such as one day
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or one week) after a new attorney joins a firm or any
other specific triggering event. Michigan does not
even include a vague reference that screens must be
“timely.” Is there a “plain meaning” of the absence of
any specific timing requirement?
• The rules also provide that after a screen is
implemented, the firm must “promptly” notify an
appropriate tribunal. This suggests that the drafters
knew how to impose a timing requirement when the
mood struck them, so doesn’t the lack of any similar
requirement for the screen itself further suggest that no
such requirement exists?
• Or does the interpretative argument run the other
way? The preface to the screening requirement is
phrased in the present tense (the firm “is disqualified
. . . unless”); so does this suggest that the screen must
be imposed immediately upon the firm’s discovery that
the new associate is “infected” by her awareness of her
ex-employer’s client’s confidential information?

This exercise also helps prepare
students to interpret other
quasi-legislative authorities
like court or evidentiary rules,
administrative codes, and
municipal ordinances.
Any ethics-based problem will give rise to some general
interpretative issues. Most state ethics codes are based
on the ABA’s Model Rules in a way analogous to
statutory schemes based on uniform acts. When a state
modifies or declines to adopt some provisions of a model
code, how does that affect the interpretation of the law as
actually enacted? For example, the Model Rules include
an explanatory comment about whether imputed
disqualification applies when the bearer of confidential
information acquired that information while a law
student. Michigan’s rules say nothing about this. The
Model Rules specifically define “screened.” Michigan
does not. What interpretations, if any, flow from these
differences?
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From there, we turn to other interpretative questions:
If the fact-finder has discretion to assess timing issues
case by case, what factors should be considered? Do
the rules themselves identify any such considerations,
either on their face or by reasonable inference? Should
students look to other timing requirements in the ethics
rules to make arguments by analogy? What about cases,
ethics opinions, or secondary sources? And, finally,
how do these factors apply to the specific facts of the
assignment?
As another general issue, the explanatory comments
raise interesting questions of “legislative history,”
because they are designed to “explain[] and illustrate[]
the meaning and purpose” of the rules. Yet the
comments are only guides to meaning, and the text of
the rules themselves is authoritative. How can students
use these comments to help support their interpretation
of a given rule?
One such way is for the students to shore up their
policy arguments. Should a court err on the side of
disqualification if there’s any doubt whether secrets
could have been disclosed before a screen was
imposed? On the one hand, ensuring confidentiality
of client secrets is a bedrock principle of the attorney/
client relationship. On the other hand, interpreting the
disqualification rules too strictly could hinder the ability
of lawyers to move from firm to firm, and could be used
as a litigation tactic to unfairly force opposing parties to
be stripped of their chosen counsel.
In sum, basing a brief writing assignment on ethics
codes allows me to reinforce statutory interpretation
techniques introduced the previous semester, plus drive
home some ethical lessons about maintaining client
confidentiality and how law firms try to avoid conflicts
of interest.
1 The problem was originally created by my Michigan colleague Phil
Frost.
2 For an article on a similar theme, see Amy Montemarano, Using Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 11 to Teach Statutory Construction, 20 The Second
Draft 9 (Dec. 2005).
3 Mich. R. Prof. Conduct 1.10(b). By contrast, the ABA’s Model Rules of
Professional Conduct do not formally authorize screens for lawyers
moving laterally from firm to firm, and only allow screens in limited
situations such as when government lawyers move to the private sector
or when a prospective client reveals confidential information to an
attorney during an initial interview. See Model R. Prof. Conduct 1.11(b)
& 1.18(d).
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